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Abstract
Climate-related foreign aid is on the rise, with signatories to the Paris Climate agreement pledging $100 billion annually
to promote mitigation and adaptation in recipient countries. While this seems like a welcome development, we have little
evidence that climate aid actually encourages recipients to adopt climate legislation. In this article, we examine the rela-
tionship between climate aid and recipient climate policy. Using multiple measures of each, we find no evidence that the
former is systematically related to the latter. Although this suggests that climate aid is ineffective, this conclusion must be
qualified due to the poor quality of both climate aid and climate policy data. More definitive conclusions will require more
accurate coding of climate aid as well as better climate policy measures that distinguish truly consequential policies from
less consequential ones.
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1. Introduction
Concerns about climate change continue to mount,
along with scientific evidence of its risks. A recent re-
port by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change concluded that a “business as usual”
scenario would lead global temperatures to rise by
1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2040
(Masson-Delmotte & et al., 2018). The likely conse-
quences include rising sea levels, worsening droughts
and wildfires, food shortages, species extinctions and ex-
treme weather events. Preventing these changes will be
difficult, requiring the virtual elimination of carbon emis-
sions over the next two decades. This presents particular
challenges for developing countries, which will need to
undertake costly mitigationmeasures even as they strug-
gle to adapt to these climatic effects.1
One way to help poor countries respond to the
climate challenge is to increase climate-related foreign
aid. Aid could reduce the economic costs of mitigation
measures, help developing countries adapt to climate-
related threats, and incentivize recipients to adopt such
policies. For these reasons, aid has become a central
plank in efforts to combat climate change. During the
2009 Copenhagen climate conference, developed coun-
tries pledged $100 billion annually to assist developing
countries with mitigation and adaptation, and this com-
mitment was formalized in Article 9 of the Paris Climate
Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change [UNFCCC], 2015). The rising prominence of
climate aid raises a perennial question: Is foreign aid effec-
tive? Does it really help recipients combat climate change?
This question is important, given the mixed overall
track record of foreign aid. As Qian (2015, p. 280) notes,
1 This is not to suggest that developing countries are primarily responsible for solving the climate problem: only a few are major emitters, and developed
countries account for the bulk of historical carbon emissions. Our point is that the costs of mitigation and adaptation are particularly burdensome to
countries that are already poor.
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research on the effects of aid has yielded no firm conclu-
sions: “Depending on the measures used, the empirical
strategy employed, and the context of the study, the re-
sults can vary widely, from finding that aid can be quite
beneficial to being harmful.” Moreover, this research fo-
cuses mostly on economic growth and development: we
have no systematic evidence on whether aid influences
recipient environmental policy. Case studies suggest that
appropriately designed aid programs can facilitate cli-
mate policy adoption (Barnett, 2008; Chen & He, 2013).
However, the broader literature on aid makes clear that
potential benefits are not always realized. We thus need
more systematic research on how climate aid affects re-
cipient climate policies.
Such research requires good data on both variables.
Unfortunately, we lack such data. Although the OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s “Rio mark-
ers” are meant to identify climate-related aid, a num-
ber of studies demonstrate that these markers lack both
validity and reliability (Donner, Kandlikar, & Webber,
2016; Hicks, Parks, Roberts, & Tierney, 2008; Junghans
& Harmeling, 2012; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011;
Roberts & Weikmans, 2017; Weikmans, Roberts, Baum,
Bustos, & Durand, 2017). Extant measures of climate
policy exhibit even more serious problems. The mere
ratification of international climate agreements such
as the Kyoto Protocol or the UNFCCC tells us little
about how seriously signatories are addressing climate
change through domestic policies. The Grantham Insti-
tute’s Climate Change Laws of the World database (n.d.)
provides a wealth of information on national climate-
related laws. But without coding this legislation for
scope, depth and implementation, we cannot aggregate
these laws into a meaningful measure of climate action.
Of extant measures, Steves and Teytelboym’s (2013)
Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI)
comes closest to accurately measuring national climate
policy. But as we discuss below, this measure also has
serious limitations.
Although these data limitations are well-known, they
require emphasis because, in the absence of good al-
ternatives, scholars increasingly employ these data to
draw conclusions about both climate aid and climate pol-
icy. For example, Bagchi, Castro and Michaelowa (2016),
Betzold and Weiler (2017), Halimanjaya and Papyrakis
(2015), Klöck, Molenaers and Weiler (2018), and Weiler,
Klöck and Dornan (2018) all employ Rio markers to study
the allocation of climate aid, while Schmidt and Fleig
(2018) employ counts of Grantham climate laws to study
the evolution of national climate policies. Without ad-
dressing the abovementioned measurement concerns,
such studies may provide a misleading picture of devel-
opments in both policy domains.
To illustrate this point, we examine the relationship
between extant measures of climate aid and climate pol-
icy. We obtain climate aid data from Tierney et al. (2011),
which includes the Rio markers, and Michaelowa and
Michaelowa (2011), who provide an alternative and ar-
guably more accurate coding of mitigation and adap-
tation aid. We employ climate policy data from the
Grantham Institute and Steves and Teytelboym (2013).
Given the questionable validity of both aid and climate
policy measures, we do not expect to find any associa-
tions between the two beyond what might result from
randommeasurement error. This is exactly what we find.
Of 66 estimated aid coefficients, only three (4.5 per-
cent) are significant—which, at the .05 significance level,
is about what random measurement error would pro-
duce. These null results are robust to various measures,
samples and estimation techniques. Moreover, even the
three significant coefficients are anomalous: for example,
mitigation aid predicts adaptation policies but notmitiga-
tion policies. There seems little reason to attribute these
results to anything but random chance.
Of course,wedonot know that our null results reflect
measurement error. It is also possible that climate aid
really does not affect recipient climate policies, or that
endogenous aid allocation—which we have been unable
to adequately address—biases our analyses toward null
results. Without knowing the true relationship between
climate aid and climate policy—which we cannot know
without better data—we cannot reject these alternative
interpretations. It is worth noting, however, that our con-
trol variables also fare poorly: only a handful of coeffi-
cients are significant, none of them robustly across the
various models. This also suggests that we are trying to
predict variation that is more random than systematic.2
Given the known limitations of extant climate aid and
policy measures, the simplest explanation for our results
is “garbage in, garbage out.” That is, we cannot expect
to find robust, significant relationships among variables
that are largely unrelated to the concepts of interest.
For this reason, we do not conclude that climate
aid is ineffective at combating climate change. Rather,
our central message is that we cannot even begin to
study this question without a much larger investment in
measurement techniques and data collection. With for-
eign aid, the central challenge is identifying aid that is
clearly climate-relevant. Previous studies provide some
guidelines for doing so (Donner et al., 2016; Junghans
& Harmeling, 2012; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011;
Roberts & Weikmans, 2017; Weikmans et al., 2017),
but implementation remains a formidable task. With
climate policy, the task is more difficult still. Diverse
national policies—carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems,
clean energy subsidies, regulatory requirements, petrol
taxes, feed-in tariffs, energy efficiency measures, and so
on—must somehow be aggregated into a single cross-
nationally comparable metric, ideally after weighting
these policies according to not only their importance on
2 Steves and Teytelboym (2013) are more successful at predicting variation in the CLIMI index. This is probably because their sample includes developed
countries, which we do not include due to our focus on aid recipients. Our different results suggest that CLIMI is better at measuring variation between
developed and developing countries than within the latter group alone.
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paper but also their implementation. Although this is a
daunting task, it is similar to that faced by trade-policy
scholars who must aggregate diverse nontariff barriers
into a single ad valorem tariff equivalent (Kee, Nicita, &
Olarreaga, 2009). Their success at doing so suggests that
climate scholars may also find ways to construct, for ex-
ample, an ad valorem carbon tax equivalent. In any case,
progress toward this goal is essential if we are to say with
any confidence whether and how foreign aid affects cli-
mate policy.
2. Climate Aid and Climate Policy
For concreteness, we begin by clarifying the scope of our
study. First, we are interested in the effects of climate
aid, i.e., aid meant to promote either climate change
mitigation or adaptation. Such aid has risen dramati-
cally in recent years. In 2001, donors established sev-
eral funds to increase poor-country participation in the
Kyoto Protocol: an adaptation fund, a fund to finance
the transition to greener technologies, and a Clean De-
velopmentMechanism to finance greenhouse-gas reduc-
ing projects (Hicks et al., 2008, pp. 258–259). At the
2009 Copenhagen conference, donors pledged $100 bil-
lion annually to promote mitigation and adaptation, and
this commitment was formalized in the Paris Climate
Agreement. Although disbursements have lagged behind
these commitments, there seems little doubt that cli-
mate aid is on the rise. According to the OECD (n.d.), to-
tal climate-related aid rose from around $700 million in
2000 to $19 billion in 2010 to $52 billion in 2016.
Second, we focus on bilateral rather than multilat-
eral aid. This is partly because we rely on Michaelowa
andMichaelowa’s (2011) coding, which covers only bilat-
eral aid. However, it is also true that most climate aid is
bilateral. Victor (2013, p. 5) estimates that “bilateral cli-
mate change assistance is more than twenty times larger
than multilateral funds,” and Marcoux, Parks, Peratsakis,
Roberts and Tierney (2013) show that this trend toward
bilateralism is increasing over time. Bilateral aid is thus
substantivelymore important andmore likely to have dis-
cernible effects.
Third, we are interested in how this aid affects re-
cipient climate policies: i.e., policies that either mitigate
climate change (by reducing greenhouse gas emissions)
or adapt to its effects (by taking measures to deal with
rising sea levels, droughts, crop failures, etc.). Such poli-
cies have also proliferated in recent years. For exam-
ple, in 2008, Brazil passed the “National Plan on Climate
Change”; Chile passed the “National Climate Change
Action Plan”; India passed the “National Action Plan on
Climate Change,” and so on (Grantham Institute, n.d.). Al-
though some of these policies are of questionable signif-
icance, it is clear that a growing number of poor coun-
tries are making at least a cosmetic effort to address cli-
mate change.
This focus excludes some important questions. Our
focus on climate aid means that we do not consider the
effects of development aid more broadly. Similarly, our
focus on climate policiesmeans that we do not consider
direct economic links between aid and climate change,
e.g., aid-fueled growth causing higher carbon emissions.
Although these issues areworth exploring, it is important
to look specifically at the climate aid-policy link. Climate
aid is donors’ key policy lever for helping poor countries
cope with climate change. If it does not work, we must
ask whether these funds could be more effectively used
in other ways. And while aid could affect climate out-
comes through non-legislative channels, large-scale miti-
gation and adaptation seem unlikely without public poli-
cies that alter private-sector incentives.
How might climate aid affect recipient climate poli-
cies? Perhaps the simplest mechanism is that aid can
relax the recipient government’s budget constraint, al-
lowing it to spend more on climate mitigation or adap-
tation. This is the intuition in Chao and Yu (1999) and
Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri and Michael (2002): in these
models, an increase in foreign aid reduces pollution
by increasing resources for pollution abatement. The
increased-spending link is clearly relevant to adaptation
measures, which typically require governments to spend
money on projects such as dikes, dams, wells, irrigation,
and so on. However, fiscal resources can also play an
important role in mitigation policy in the form of subsi-
dies or tax breaks to encourage clean energy production
and consumption. An important caveat to this argument,
as Eyckmans, Fankhauser and Kverndokk (2016) note, is
that climate aid may simply allow recipients to reallo-
cate their current climate finance to other ends, yield-
ing no net increase in climate-related spending. They
recommend giving climate aid in the form of match-
ing grants, in which aid is proportional to domestic cli-
mate spending.3
Even if aid incentivizes climate action via increased re-
sources, we need to askwhy it would lead to new climate
legislation—an important question because our empiri-
cal analysis focuses on such legislation rather than spend-
ing per se.Much aid is project-specific: it is earmarked for
projects such as dams, wind turbines, and rural infras-
tructure projects. Why would external funding for such
projects lead recipients to pass new legislation?
One answer is that aid could boost the need for im-
plementing legislation, i.e., laws that implement projects
wholly or partially funded by aid. For example, Vietnam’s
“Decisions No. 37/2011/QD-TTg and 39/2018/QD-TTg on
the support for Wind Power Projects” (Vietnam Law &
Legal Forum, 2011) provides detailed rules for the estab-
lishment and operation of wind power projects, includ-
ing licensing requirements, electricity purchase prices
per kilowatt-hour, subsidies per kilowatt-hour, and so on.
Although aid probably did not “cause” this legislation,
the latter would not exist without wind power projects.
3 Matching grants would constitute a form of aid conditionality. This is another possible channel through which aid donors could influence recipient
climate policy. At present, however, this possibility is largely hypothetical, since climate aid is generally not conditional.
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To the extent that aid makes such project possible, it also
generates a need for the implementing legislation.
Perhaps more importantly, much climate aid funds
“capacity building” projects. Capacity building is a broad
concept that, in this context, largely boils down to a
society’s ability to formulate and implement mitigation
and adaptation policies. As such, it encompasses such
diverse elements as training public and private-sector
actors, building bureaucracies to formulate and imple-
ment policies, and educating the public (Victor, 2013).
Although capacity building involves both the public and
private sector, the government plays a central role. It is
typically government agencies that manage and coordi-
nate activities like scientific research, planning and build-
ing infrastructure, taxing fossil fuels and subsidizing clean
energy, disaster relief, and so on. For this reason, a large
fraction of climate aid is targeted toward government ca-
pacity building (Victor, 2013, p. 4).
Building government capacity typically involves legis-
lation. In fact, of the 1,512 climate laws currently listed
in the Grantham database, 127 (8 percent) are wholly
dedicated to building institutions and administrative ar-
rangements, and another 700 (46 percent) are partially
dedicated to this goal. An example is Mali’s “Decree
No. 2011-107-PM-RMofMarch 11, 2011 establishing the
National Climate Change Committee of Mali” (Republic
of Mali, 2011). This created a National Climate Change
Committee responsible for implementing UNFCCC and
other international obligations, securing funding for this
purpose, preparing Mali’s participation in international
climate conferences, and providing the government with
information on climate-related issues. The linkages with
aid are clear: this legislation was passed in part to help
Mali administer aid-financed projects, as well as to se-
cure future funding. More generally, if aid increases the
fiscal feasibility of climate measures, it also creates a
need for administrative institutions and personnel, and
hence for capacity-building legislation.
Despite these plausible linkages, there are reasons
to doubt the efficacy of climate aid. One is the mixed
record of foreign aid more generally (Qian, 2015). If de-
velopment aid oftendoesn’twork—due towaste, corrup-
tion, bad governance, etc.—it is not clear why climate
aid should fare any better. Studies on environmental aid
specifically reinforce this point. For example, Connolly
(1996, p. 333) notes that “donors do not always provide
aid in order to solve environmental problems…donor
governments…sometimes care more about the appear-
ance of doing something…than about finding genuine
solutions.” Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011) support
this view, showing that (1) much climate aid has noth-
ing to do with climate-related projects, and (2) govern-
ments have domestic political motives to attach climate
markers to aid. If donors simply want to show that they
are “doing something,” they may not monitor recipients
closely—and the latter may do little themselves. This un-
derscores the need to examine the aid-climate policy
link empirically.
Although there is a growing body of research on
climate aid allocation (Bagchi et al., 2016; Betzold &
Weiler, 2017; Halimanjaya & Papyrakis, 2015; Hicks et
al., 2008; Klöck et al., 2018; Weiler et al., 2018), we
know little about its effects. A study of World Bank-
financed projects found that the track record of environ-
mental projects is poor: only 26 percent of environmen-
tal project outcomes were deemed satisfactory, com-
pared with an average success rate of 80 percent in eight
other sectors (World Bank, 2005, p. 12). We do not know
how many of these projects were climate-related, how-
ever, or whether any of them involved policy changes.
Case studies that focus on climate aid show that well-
designed programs can facilitate mitigation and adapta-
tion (Barnett, 2008; Chen & He, 2013). However, due
to their narrow scope, these studies reveal more about
what is possible than what is typical.
Mak Arvin, Dabir-Alai and Lew (2006) examine the re-
lationship between development aid and carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions. They find causality in both directions:
aid causes emissions and emissions cause aid. However,
the sign of this relationship (positive or negative) varies
across countries, and “no obvious grouping of develop-
ing countries with common characteristics emerges with
respect to a particular causal finding” (Mak Arvin et al.,
2006, p. 76). Their results are thus mixed. Moreover,
these emissions-based results probably reflect the asso-
ciation between CO2 emissions and growth: that is, aid
causes higher (lower) emissions when it promotes (hin-
ders) growth, and emissions cause increased (decreased)
aidwhen donors reward recipients for good (bad) growth
performance. Hence, while these results are interesting,
they also tell us little about the aid-climate policy link.
Given the dearth of direct evidence on this relationship,
there is a pressing need for further empirical research.
3. Data Sources
We obtain data on climate aid and climate policy from
well-established and widely used sources. Our aid data
are from AidData’s project-level database (Tierney et al.,
2011), which provides data on aid commitments and
disbursements from the OECD Creditor Reporting Sys-
tem as well as individual donor agencies (AidData, n.d.).4
Our climate policy data are from the Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and
from Steves and Teytelboym (2013), which introduces
the CLIMI index. Although these are, to our knowledge,
the best available sources of data on climate aid and cli-
mate policy, they raise a number of measurement con-
cerns. We discuss these concerns below, beginning with
climate aid.
In 1995, donors began coding aid projects with “Rio
markers,” which indicate whether projects relate to bio-
4 PLAID version 1.9.2 was accessed on 19 October 2010. We use this release of the data because it employs the same project codes as Michaelowa and
Michaelowa (2011).
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diversity, desertification or climate change. In 2011,
donors also began classifying climate aid according to
its purpose (mitigation or adaptation). In principle, these
markers make it easy to identify climate-related bilateral
aid. In practice, scholars have questioned how accurately
these markers convey the true purpose of aid.
Assessments of the original (pre-2011) Rio climate
marker—which, strictly speaking, only pertained to mit-
igation projects—were skeptical. For example, Roberts,
Starr, Jones and Abdel-Fattah (2008) examined a ran-
dom sample of 115,000 aid projects and found that only
25 percent of projects with Rio climate markers were
actually relevant to climate change. Michaelowa and
Michaelowa (2011) examined all 636,962 aid activities in
theDACdatabase and came to similar conclusions. Of the
10,414 projects with Riomarkers, only 2,798 (27 percent)
had any relevance to mitigation. Another 1,277 projects
(12 percent) were relevant to adaptation. Even if we
broaden the DAC’s definition of climate relevance to in-
clude both mitigation and adaptation, nearly two-thirds
of projects with Rio markers had nothing to do with cli-
mate. As examples of such miscoding, Michaelowa and
Michaelowa (2011, p. 2010) cite the following (donors
in parentheses):
• Savannah elephant vocalization (US);
• Uniforms for park guardians in Central America
(Spain);
• Tobacco control (New Zealand);
• Lead reduction in transport fuels in Pakistan (UK);
• Earthquake safety (Switzerland);
• Monetary climate inDemocratic Republic of Congo
(Belgium);
• Love movie festival (Belgium).
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011) conclude that,
while some errors are probably accidental, donors also
have incentives to deliberately miscode data to give the
appearance of addressing climate change.
Studies on the post-2010 Rio Markers, which code
projects for both mitigation and adaptation, have been
no less critical. Junghans and Harmeling (2012) con-
clude that 65 percent of projects with the adaptation
marker are unrelated to adaptation. Moreover, the de-
gree of over-reporting varies across donors: hence the
Rio marker lacks reliability as well as validity. Weikmans
et al. (2017, p. 458) reach similar conclusions, arguing
that “the absence of independent quality control makes
the adaptation Rio marker data almost entirely unreli-
able.” These coding irregularities have made their way
into real-world policy debates: for example, during the
Paris climate negotiations, India argued that developed
countries provided only $2.2 billion of climate aid in
2014, rather than the $62 billion claimed by donors
(Roberts & Weikmans, 2017, p. 130). For our purposes,
the central problem is that these inaccuracies make it dif-
ficult to credibly estimate the effects of climate aid.
Although we employ Rio markers in our analysis,
we also use Michaelowa and Michaelowa’s alternative
(2011) coding. We do this for two reasons. First, be-
cause the latter data have been coded by disinterested
third parties, they should be more accurate than donor-
reported data. Second, Michaelowa and Michaelowa’s
(2011) data allow us to distinguish mitigation and adap-
tation aid prior to 2011. For both reasons, these data
should permit us to estimate more accurately the rela-
tionship between climate aid and climate policy.
If the climate aid data are questionable, climate pol-
icy data raise even greater measurement concerns. As
Bernauer (2013, p. 435) observes, existing datasets “of-
fer aggregatemeasures of ambition levels of climate poli-
cies but no information on the adoption of specific cli-
mate policy instruments.” The measurement problem is
twofold. First, it is difficult to assess the contribution
each policy makes to climate mitigation or adaptation.
How, for example, can we compare a national carbon
tax, a cap-and-trade program, a set of subsidies for clean
energy, and a law mandating energy efficiency? In prin-
ciple, each policy could be converted into a compara-
ble metric such as a carbon tax equivalent or an esti-
mated emissions reduction. In practice, this economet-
ric task has yet to be achieved, making it difficult to
compare the depth and scope of diverse national poli-
cies. Second, without accomplishing this first task, we
cannot aggregate diverse policies into a single national
index of climate mitigation or adaptation. Some schol-
ars circumvent these problems by treating international
commitments—for example, ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol or the UNFCCC—as proxies for climate orien-
tation (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Neumayer, 2002; von
Stein, 2008). However, because these agreements im-
pose no binding emissions commitments on most aid re-
cipients, and because membership is now nearly univer-
sal, ratification alone tells us little about signatories’ cli-
mate policies.
In the absence of better alternatives, some schol-
ars have begun to analyze national climate policies us-
ing a simple count of climate-related laws. For exam-
ple, Schmidt and Fleig (2018) document the evolution of
national climate policies using the Grantham Institute’s
Climate Change Laws of the World database. This is a
comprehensive catalog of climate-related laws passed
in all countries of the world from 1963 to 2018. Be-
sides providing verbal descriptions, it classifies each
law by function: energy supply, energy demand, institu-
tions/administrative arrangements, adaptation, REDD+
and LULUCF, research and development, transporta-
tion, and carbon pricing. The appeal of this dataset is
clear: it provides an off-the-shelf source of data on var-
ious dimensions of climate policy. However, while the
Grantham database is an invaluable resource, it does
not yet provide enough information to compare the var-
ious laws or to aggregate them into a single climate pol-
icy index.
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To begin with the first point: Grantham provides
no information on how consequential the various laws
are. For example, Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative
Amendment Act of 2014 creates an economy-wide emis-
sions trading system (Parliament of Australia, 2014).
This seems more consequential than Israel’s “Energy Re-
sources Regulations (Energy labeling of electric heating
furnaces), 1993” (State of Israel, 1993), which requires
that manufacturers of electric heating furnaces and in-
duction motors provide energy efficiency labels. Simi-
larly, India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change
(Government of India, n.d.)—which contains specific tar-
gets, tax provisions, and subsidies—seems more sub-
stantial than Gambia’s National Climate Change Policy
(Urquhart, 2016), which is a strategy document with no
concrete provisions. Because we do not know how im-
portant each law is, we have no basis for weighting them
before combining them into a summary index. Without
obtaining further information, we must rely on a simple
count approach, as in Schmidt and Fleig (2018). The draw-
backs of this approach are apparent: it is entirely possible
that one well-devised climate law—say, a national car-
bon tax—could have a deeper impact on emissions than
dozens of small-bore or aspirational policies. In terms
of substantive significance, a simple count of laws could
well be meaningless.
In saying this, we do not mean to criticize either the
Grantham Institute or Schmidt and Fleig (2018). Assess-
ing these laws’ substantive impact would require not
only fluency in many languages but also expertise in pre-
dicting the country-specific environmental impact of di-
verse policies. This is a herculean task. Our point, rather,
is that relying on a simple count measure—however
understandable—probably tells us little about climate
policy. We employ this approach here because it is fea-
sible and has been employed elsewhere. However, be-
cause this measure probably captures no meaningful
variation in climate policy, we do not expect it to be sys-
tematically related to climate aid—or, for that matter,
to our controls. In other words, we employ it mainly to
illustrate the hazards of relying on extant climate pol-
icy measures.
In addition to the Grantham measure, we employ
Steves and Teytelboym’s (2013) CLIMI index. CLIMI is
based on policies reported to the UNFCCC between
2005 and 2011. Policies are first sorted into four
classifications—international cooperation, domestic cli-
mate framework, sector-specific measures, and cross-
sectoral measures—then given scores of 0, .5, or 1 de-
pending on how close they come to worldwide best
practice. Average scores in each classification are then
weighted according to the contribution each makes
to worldwide emission reductions, and the weighted
scores are summed. The resulting measure ranges from
0 to 1, with higher values implying more ambitious cli-
mate policy.
CLIMI remedies some weaknesses of our Grantham
measure by weighting policies according to their likely
impact. However, CLIMI has serious limitations as well.
Perhaps most importantly, it does not incorporate infor-
mation on policy implementation: hence, CLIMI scores
may reflect aspirations as much as substantive policy
steps. Second, the weighting scheme is very coarse and
cannot capture much of the variation in policy impact.
Third, it is a pure cross-section of 95 countries, many of
which are developed. This sample limitation is a particu-
lar problem when analyzing developing-world aid recipi-
ents: in our CLIMI regressions, observations range from
44 to 55. Finally, because the CLIMI index incorporates
all policies notified between 2005 and 2011—many of
which were passed before 2005—we cannot match the
years in which aid was received to the years in which poli-
cies were passed.
Again, the point is not to criticize Steves and
Teytelboym (2013),whohave taken the first steps toward
aggregating diverse national policies into a single climate
policy index. Rather, it is that the CLIMI index may tell
us little about aid recipients’ actual climate orientation
or its relationship to climate aid. As with the Grantham
measure, CLIMI’s various sources of measurement error
may mask the true relationship between climate aid and
climate policy.
In sum, extant measures of climate aid and climate
policy lack validity, reliability, or both. Much Rio marker
“climate aid” is not actually related to climate, while avail-
able measures of climate policy may be weakly related
or unrelated to governments’ actual efforts to mitigate
or adapt to climate change. We therefore do not expect
thesemeasures to be related to one another, beyond the
occasional significance that can arise from random mea-
surement error.
4. Analysis and Results
Our analysis includes all aid-eligible countries and years
for which data were available for all variables. The result-
ing sample sizes vary widely, from a minimum of 44 in
some cross-sectional CLIMI regressions to a maximum of
951 in our panel analyses. The number of countries ranges
from 44 to 100, depending on the analysis, while the lon-
gitudinal coverage is 1996 to 2009 for the Grantham anal-
yses and 2005 to 2011 for the CLIMI analyses.5
We employ three dependent variables based on
Grantham data. Climate Policyit is a cumulative count of
country i’s climate laws in year t. Mitigation Policyit is
a cumulative count of country i’s mitigation laws, and
Adaptation Policyit is a cumulative count of i’s adaptation
laws.6 Because we include a lagged dependent variable
in all panel analyses, we are predicting the likelihood that
country iwill pass additional laws from time t−1 to time t.
As a robustness check, we also employ CLIMIi, country i’s
CLIMI score, as a dependent variable.
5 These years refer to the dependent variable observations. Aid, which is lagged by one year, covers 1995 to 2008.
6 Grantham has an explicit category for adaptation. We treat all remaining laws as mitigation-related.
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We employ six climate aid variables, all from Aid-
Data’s PLAID 1.9.2 database (Tierney et al., 2011). In
the original data, the Rio markers code projects as 0
if they have no climate relevance, 1 if climate is a sig-
nificant objective, and 2 if climate is the main objec-
tive. We combine the latter two outcomes to create a di-
chotomous indicator of whether aid projects are climate-
related or not. We sum all climate aid for each recipient
country and year, divide by population to obtain aid per
capita, and log this measure to reduce skewness.7 We
construct measures for both aid commitments and dis-
bursements in case these two variables have distinct ef-
fects.8 Ln(Climate Aid Commitmentsit−1) and Ln(Climate
Aid Disbursementsit−1) are our first two measures of cli-
mate aid. We lag these and all other right-hand side vari-
ables by one period to ensure that the independent vari-
ables are realized before the dependent variable.
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011) additionally
classify aid projects asmitigation-related and adaptation-
related. Using their coding, we construct four addi-
tional aid variables: Ln(Mitigation Aid Commitmentsit−1),
Ln(Mitigation Aid Disbursementsit−1), Ln(Adaptation
Aid Commitmentsit−1), and Ln(Adaptation Aid Disburse-
mentsit−1).
We include a number of controls. First, we include
Ln(Other ODAit−1), recipient i’s non-climate aid in year
t − 1. This is simply the log of i’s total per capita ODA
minus climate aid. We include this so our climate aid
variables do not spuriously capture the effects of de-
velopment aid more generally.9 We include Ln(GDP Per
Capitait−1) to control for economic development, and
its quadratic term, Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1), in case there
exists an environmental Kuznets curve for climate poli-
cies.10 We includeGrowthit−1, the GDP per capita growth
rate, in case faster growth makes it politically easier to
pass climate legislation.11 We include Ln(Government
Spendingit−1), logged government consumption spend-
ing as a percent of GDP, as a proxy for government ideol-
ogy (left-leaning governments should spend more than
right-leaning ones).12 We include Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1), the
logged percent of electricity provided by oil, gas and coal,
in case fossil-fuel dependency makes it harder to pass cli-
mate laws.13 We include Ln(Opennessit−1), logged trade
as a percent of GDP, in case trade openness affects cli-
mate politics by exposing carbon-intensive industries to
international competition.14 We include Polityit−1, coun-
try i’s Polity score, in case domestic regime type affects
the provision of climate policies.15 Finally, we include a
lagged dependent variable in all panel analyses.
Because our primary dependent variable is a count
of climate laws, we employ Poisson regressions, which
are more appropriate for count data than linear regres-
sion. We employ recipient fixed effects in all panel anal-
yses, which eliminates unobserved cross-national varia-
tion and allows us to focus on the within-country rela-
tionship between aid and climate policies. We also in-
clude year fixed effects to control for unobserved year-
specific shocks or trends. To reduce the influence of out-
liers, we perform jackknife regressions in all models.16
To address serial correlation, we employ robust country-
clustered standard errors. Aid coefficients based on an-
nual panels are shown in Figure 1.
To save space, we present our climate aid results
graphically and relegate control-variable results to the
Appendix. Figure 1(a) shows coefficients for the six cli-
mate aid variables when the dependent variable is all cli-
mate policies, with 95 percent confidence intervals indi-
cated by the error bars. Figures 1(b) and 1(c) present the
same informationwhen the dependent variables aremit-
igation and adaptation policies, respectively. In nearly
all cases, the error bars include the value of zero, indi-
cated by the red vertical lines. Our measures of climate
aid are thus, for the most part, not significantly related
to climate policies. Of the 18 aid coefficients, only three
are statistically significant. Climate aid commitments, as
defined by the Rio marker, predict significantly more cli-
mate policies overall as well as more adaptation policies.
One possible interpretation of these results is that they
are driven by adaptation aid, which should predict adap-
tation but not mitigation policy. However, the results for
mitigation and adaptation aid commitments cast doubt
on this interpretation. Mitigation commitments predict
adaptation policies but not mitigation policies, while
adaptation commitments do not predict adaptation poli-
cies. This is the opposite of what we would expect if our
variables were well-measured and aid was achieving its
stated goals. In sum, our most consistent predictor is Rio-
marked climate aid—which has well-documented mea-
7 We add 1 before logging to keep observations with zero aid.
8 Commitments should matter more if recipients are motivated by the promise of aid, while disbursements should matter more if recipients require aid
in hand to pass legislation.
9 Correlations between climate and non-climate aid range from .13 to .33.
10 A number of studies find evidence of an EKC for CO2 emissions. See Apergis and Ozturk (2015) for a recent example.
11 Ward and Cao (2012) find that high unemployment leads to lower “green taxes,” implying that recessions reduce support for environmental regulations.
We employ growth rates rather than unemployment because data on the latter are unavailable for many aid recipients.
12 Ward and Cao (2012) find that left governments adopt higher levels of “green taxes,” including taxes on emissions. We employ government spending
as a proxy because direct ideology data are unavailable for many aid recipient.
13 Steves and Teytelboym (2013) find that a larger carbon-intensive sector leads to less stringent climatemitigation, presumably because carbon-intensive
industries oppose such policies. Our measure captures consumers’ interest in cheap fossil fuels as well as the interests of fossil fuel energy providers.
14 Systematic research on this point is lacking, but international competitiveness concerns are common in debates about climatemitigation. For example,
in 2009, two U.S. Senators wrote in a New York Times op-ed that “climate change is real and threatens our economy and national security…[but] we
cannot sacrifice another job to competitors overseas” (Kerry & Graham, 2009).
15 Bättig and Bernauer (2009) find that democracies have a higher output of climate-friendly policies. Polity scores are from the Polity IV Project (Center
for Systemic Peace, n.d.). All other controls are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (n.d.).
16 The jackknife procedure sequentially drops each country from the data and reports the average of the estimates.
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Figure 1. Climate aid and Grantham climate policy, annual panels.
surement problems—while the only other significant co-
efficient is anomalous. These results, along with the 15
insignificant coefficients, raise doubts aboutwhether the
few significant coefficients are substantively meaningful.
Climate policies are “sticky,” in that they are not
passed frequently. Regressing year-to-year changes in cli-
mate policy against year-to-year changes in foreign aid
may thus not constitute a fair test. To allow for the possi-
bility that aid affects climate policy with long and varying
lags, we perform two additional analyses. First, follow-
ing Knack (2004), we regress the entire-period change
in climate policies—that is, the change between the first
and last periods—against the whole-period average for
climate aid and the controls. Both the dependent and
the independent variables are thus collapsed into a sin-
gle cross-section. The idea is that, while itmay be difficult
tomatch climate policy in year twith aid in any particular
t − n, countries that receive more aid over the entire pe-
riod may exhibit larger changes in climate policy. Results
of this analysis are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2’s structure is the same as Figure 1’s, with
aid variables presented on the left and sub-graphs (a),
(b) and (c) showing coefficients and confidence intervals
for all climate,mitigation and adaptation policies, respec-
tively. The results are easily summarized: of the 18 coef-
ficients, none are significant.
Second, we collapse the data into four-year panels,
with each variable taking the average for each period.
We thus regress average climate policy in four-year pe-
riod t against average aid in four-year period t − 1. In
addition to being less noisy, the four-year averages al-
low for longer lags in the effects of aid. Because the
averaged dependent variables no longer take on inte-
ger values, we employ ordinary least-squares rather than
Poisson regression for this analysis. Otherwise, it is iden-
tical to our earlier panel regressions. Results are shown in
Figure 3. Again, climate aid is never significantly related
to climate policy.17
As noted earlier, our Granthammeasure treats all cli-
mate laws as equal, regardless of howmuch they matter
in practice. A simple count of climate laws probably mis-
states the degree to which governments are addressing
climate change. We thus perform additional analyses us-
ing the CLIMI measure, which weights government poli-
cies according to their likely impact. One challenge in us-
ing this measure is that it is a cross-section based on poli-
cies reported from 2005 to 2011. Not only does it incor-
porate multiple reporting years, but many reported poli-
cies were passed before reporting began in 2005. This
makes it difficult to say what years should be included
in the cross-sectional measure of climate aid. Because
the appropriate period is not obvious, we employ two
for robustness, averaging climate aid for 2000–2005—
the five years before reporting began—and 2005–2008,
the years in which reporting occurred and for which we
have aid data. Results are shown in Figure 4. The CLIMI
results tell the same story as previous ones: of the 12 cli-
mate aid coefficients, none are significant.
17 Because the number of four-year periods in each panel is small, combining a lagged dependent variable and recipient fixed effects raises concerns
about Nickell bias. We note that we obtain very similar results both with and without the lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects.
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Figure 2. Climate aid and change in Grantham climate policies.
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Figure 3. Climate aid and Grantham climate policy, 4-year panels.
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Figure 4. Climate aid and CLIMI.
In all, we estimate 66 climate aid coefficients. Of
these, only three (4.5 percent) were significant. This
could mean several things. First, climate aid may sim-
ply not affect climate policy. Second, the impact of aid
maybemaskedby endogeneity bias. Research on climate
aid allocation suggests that it is influenced by recipient-
country characteristics (Bagchi et al., 2016; Betzold &
Weiler, 2017; Halimanjaya & Papyrakis, 2015; Hicks et al.,
2008; Klöck et al., 2018;Weiler et al., 2018), and this non-
random allocation could bias our results in either a pos-
itive or negative direction. As we have been unable to
find an instrument that strongly predicts recipient-year
variation in climate aid, we cannot rule such bias out.
Finally, we may be unable to find a relationship be-
cause our variables are poorly measured. We are in-
clined toward this explanation. The Grantham measure
lacks validity for reasons discussed above, and while
the CLIMI index is arguably more valid and reliable, its
multi-year cross-sectional structure does not allow us to
match it with aid (or other variables) from any particu-
lar year. The Rio markers for climate aid are also known
to lack validity and reliability, and while Michaelowa and
Michaelowa’s (2011) aid data are arguably more accu-
rate, this may not matter when employing dependent
variables of questionable validity. In this context, it is
worth noting that our control-variable results (shown in
the Appendix) are nearly all insignificant as well. Since
previous research suggests that these controls should
matter for climate policy, this also suggests that our
broadly insignificant results reflectmeasurement error in
our dependent variable.
5. Conclusion
Foreign aid for climate mitigation and adaptation has
risen dramatically in recent years, reflecting widespread
concerns about climate change. As with all aid, it is im-
portant to assess whether climate aid “works” in the
sense of actually promoting mitigation and adaptation.
The central message of this article is that we are not yet
in a position to make this assessment due to the poor
quality of climate aid and climate policy data. Climate aid
measured with Rio markers appears to lack both valid-
ity and reliability, as donors over-report their efforts to
varying degrees, and there is no system in place for veri-
fying their claims. Extant measures of climate policy also
lack validity, as they do not meaningfully aggregate di-
verse policies into a single cross-nationally comparable
metric. We wish to draw attention to these data limita-
tions, not only because they impede our study of this im-
portant issue, but also because these data are increas-
ingly employed in studies of both climate aid allocation
(Bagchi et al., 2016; Betzold &Weiler, 2017; Halimanjaya
& Papyrakis, 2015; Klöck et al., 2018; Weiler et al., 2018)
and climate policy (Schmidt & Fleig, 2018). We must ask
whether research based on these data paint amisleading
picture of developments in both policy domains.
Of these measurement problems, those involved
with climate aid data should be easier to remedy.
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011) have already made
progress toward more accurately coding such aid, and
other studies on this topic offer helpful suggestions
(Donner et al., 2016; Junghans & Harmeling, 2012;
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Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; Roberts & Weikmans,
2017; Weikmans et al., 2017). Without minimizing the
difficulties involved, the challenge here is essentially just
identifying aid whose core purpose is clearly climate-
relevant. In contrast, constructing more accurate mea-
sures of climate policy will be exceedingly difficult. Do-
ing so will require scholars to identify the relevant provi-
sions of diverse national policies, to estimate their likely
impact on carbon emissions or other climate-related out-
comes, and to aggregate these estimated effects into
summary indices of climate policy. Although this task
will be difficult, it is encouraging to note that schol-
ars have accomplished similar feats in other policy do-
mains: for example, aggregating diverse non-tariff barri-
ers to trade into ad valorem tariff equivalents (Looi Kee
et al., 2009). To reach meaningful conclusions about the
aid-climate policy relationship—or climate policy more
generally—scholars in this area will need to undertake
similar efforts.
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Appendix
Table A0. Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Climate Policyit 951 3.32 4.37 0 34
Mitigation Policyit 951 2.91 3.93 0 29
Adaptation Policyit 951 0.41 0.80 0 6
CLIMIi 55 0.30 0.18 0.02 0.70
Ln(Climate Aid Commitmentsit) 756 0.42 0.62 0 3.80
Ln(Mitigation Aid Commitmentsit) 862 0.34 0.61 0 3.80
Ln(Adaptation Aid Commitmentsit) 862 0.21 0.44 0 3.91
Ln(Climate Aid Disbursementsit) 741 0.08 0.17 0 1.36
Ln(Mitigation Aid Disbursementsit) 831 0.04 0.12 0 1.11
Ln(Adaptation Aid Disbursementsit) 852 0.07 0.21 0 3.61
Ln(Other ODAit) (Commitments) 862 3.78 0.95 0.65 6.99
Ln(Other ODAit) (Disbursements) 813 1.89 1.16 0.03 6.61
Ln(GDP Per Capitait) 951 7.84 1.01 5.35 10.19
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it) 951 62.40 15.62 28.58 103.74
Growthit 951 3.13 4.54 −19.06 33.03
Ln(Government Spendingit) 950 2.60 0.39 0.72 4.24
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit) 947 3.62 1.43 −3.83 4.61
Ln(Opennessit) 951 4.23 0.43 2.75 5.30
Polityit 951 3.64 5.82 −9 10
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Table A1(a). Climate aid and Grantham climate policy, annual panels.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Climate Policyit−1 0.06** 0.04 0.04 0.05** 0.05** 0.05*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(GDP Per Capitait−1) −1.02 −3.24 −3.02 −1.41 −1.72 −2.64
(3.29) (3.45) (3.54) (2.93) (3.85) (3.70)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1) 0.12 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.22
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.25) (0.24)
Growthit−1 −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Government Spendingit−1) −0.31 −0.19 −0.19 −0.37 −0.35 −0.22
(0.23) (0.31) (0.31) (0.23) (0.26) (0.28)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1) −0.04 −0.02 −0.02 −0.05 −0.02 −0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Ln(Opennessit−1) 0.02 0.33 0.34 −0.06 0.20 0.21
(0.27) (0.31) (0.32) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Polityit−1 −0.00 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln(Other ODAit−1) 0.05 −0.00 0.01 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Ln(Climate Aidit−1) 0.10* 0.10 −0.03 0.14 0.13 0.16
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.21) (0.13)
Observations (Countries) 775 (74) 951 (83) 951 (83) 751 (74) 845 (75) 875 (75)
F (Prob > F) 25.0 (.000) 15.7 (.000) 13.9 (.000) 42.8 (.000) 29.5 (.000) 20.3 (.000)
Notes: Dependent variable: Climate Policyit; Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01 * p < .05; All models include country and year fixed effects.
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Table A1(b). Climate aid and Grantham mitigation policy, annual panels.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Climate Policyit−1 0.06** 0.03 0.04 0.05** 0.06** 0.05*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(GDP Per Capitait−1) −0.73 −2.77 −2.59 −0.88 −1.11 −2.06
(2.92) (3.19) (3.29) (2.61) (3.39) (3.28)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1) 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.19
(0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22)
Growthit−1 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Government Spendingit−1) −0.27 −0.14 −0.13 −0.34 −0.29 −0.16
(0.22) (0.31) (0.31) (0.22) (0.25) (0.28)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1) −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Ln(Opennessit−1) 0.17 0.47 0.47 0.05 0.30 0.33
(0.27) (0.33) (0.34) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Polityit−1 −0.00 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Other ODAit−1) 0.05 −0.00 0.01 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Ln(Climate Aidit−1) 0.08 0.09 −0.02 0.18 0.17 0.20
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.23) (0.17)
Observations (Countries) 767 (73) 942 (82) 942 (82) 743 (73) 836 (74) 867 (74)
F (Prob > F) 24.9 (.000) 14.6 (.000) 13.0 (.000) 26.4 (.000) 24.7 (.000) 21.2 (.000)
Notes: Dependent variable: Mitigation Policyit; Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01 * p < .05; All models include country and year fixed effects.
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Table A1(c). Climate aid and Grantham adaptation policy, annual panels.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Climate Policyit−1 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.27* 0.30* 0.25
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Ln(GDP Per Capitait−1) −5.64 −7.93 −7.04 −8.72 −7.15 −7.55
(7.21) (7.31) (7.25) (6.98) (7.86) (7.75)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1) 0.32 0.48 0.41 0.52 0.43 0.46
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.49) (0.49)
Growthit−1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Government Spendingit−1) −1.01* −1.15* −1.19* −0.94* −1.18* −1.20*
(0.42) (0.49) (0.47) (0.41) (0.48) (0.50)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1) −0.11 −0.09 −0.12 −0.17 −0.11 −0.12
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Ln(Opennessit−1) −1.31 −0.93 −0.83 −1.15 −0.83 −0.77
(0.70) (0.64) (0.66) (0.71) (0.71) (0.65)
Polityit−1 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.04 −0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln(Other ODAit−1) −0.04 −0.00 0.03 −0.06 −0.07 −0.03
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Ln(Climate Aidit−1) 0.20* 0.21* −0.17 −0.14 −0.19 −0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.28) (0.59) (0.22)
Observations (Countries) 531 (50) 635 (53) 635 (53) 509 (50) 578 (50) 598 (50)
F (Prob > F) 12.0 (.000) 20.4 (.000) 17.6 (.000) 14.8 (.000) 11.6 (.000) 19.7 (.000)
Notes: Dependent variable: Adaptation Policyit; Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses, * p < .05; All models include country and year fixed effects.
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Table A2(a). Climate aid and change in Grantham climate policies.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Ln(GDP Per Capitai) 1.21 1.07 1.09 2.34 2.46* 2.16
(1.20) (0.95) (0.96) (1.22) (1.14) (1.14)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2i ) −0.08 −0.07 −0.07 −0.16 −0.17* −0.15
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Growthi 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln(Government Spendingi) −0.21 −0.21 −0.22 −0.09 −0.02 −0.05
(0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsi) −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Ln(Opennessi) −0.31 −0.30 −0.31 −0.35 −0.32 −0.34
(0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31)
Polityi 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Other ODAi) −0.18* −0.20* −0.18 −0.27* −0.36** −0.28*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Ln(Climate Commitmentsi) −0.15 −0.12 −0.43 −0.97 −1.53 −1.58
(0.28) (0.26) (0.44) (1.16) (1.27) (0.83)
Constant −0.32 0.10 0.15 −4.51 −5.10 −3.93
(4.83) (3.97) (3.95) (4.88) (4.55) (4.50)
Observations 91 100 100 89 91 92
F (Prob > F) 3.60 (.001) 3.86 (.000) 4.50 (.000) 5.12 (.000) 5.95 (.000) 6.25 (.000)
Notes: Dependent variable: Change in Climate Policy from 1995 to 2009; Robust standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01 * p < .05.
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Table A2(b). Climate aid and change in Grantham mitigation policies.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Ln(GDP Per Capitai) 1.00 0.90 0.85 2.31 2.37* 2.01
(1.29) (1.02) (1.02) (1.28) (1.16) (1.18)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2i ) −0.07 −0.06 −0.06 −0.16 −0.16* −0.14
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Growthi 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln(Government Spendingi) −0.09 −0.11 −0.11 0.05 0.11 0.09
(0.32) (0.28) (0.29) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsi) −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Ln(Opennessi) −0.28 −0.28 −0.30 −0.34 −0.30 −0.32
(0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31)
Polityi 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Other ODAi) −0.21* −0.22* −0.20 −0.31** −0.40** −0.32**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Ln(Climate Commitmentsi) −0.17 −0.21 −0.47 −1.00 −1.74 −1.84
(0.30) (0.28) (0.46) (1.19) (1.41) (0.98)
Constant 0.01 0.38 0.71 −4.79 −5.17 −3.82
(5.17) (4.29) (4.25) (5.19) (4.73) (4.73)
Observations 91 100 100 89 91 92
F (Prob > F) 2.93 (.004) 3.05 (.003) 3.70 (.001) 4.72 (.000) 6.07 (.000) 6.05 (.000)
Notes: Dependent variable: Change in Mitigation Policy from 1995 to 2009; Robust standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01 * p < .05.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 68–92 86
Table A2(c). Climate aid and change in Grantham adaptation policies.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Ln(GDP Per Capitai) 2.61 2.23 2.68 2.63 3.18 3.17
(1.83) (1.57) (1.58) (1.79) (1.87) (1.80)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2i ) −0.16 −0.14 −0.17 −0.16 −0.20 −0.20
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Growthi 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln(Government Spendingi) −0.90* −0.80* −0.82* −0.85* −0.78 −0.83
(0.42) (0.39) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsi) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Ln(Opennessi) −0.51 −0.44 −0.41 −0.44 −0.43 −0.47
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
Polityi 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Other ODAi) −0.04 −0.12 −0.05 −0.07 −0.15 −0.10
(0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Ln(Climate Commitmentsi) −0.01 0.30 −0.28 −0.90 −0.78 −0.83
(0.36) (0.32) (0.56) (1.42) (1.96) (0.93)
Constant −6.05 −4.90 −6.73 −6.46 −8.40 −8.17
(6.84) (6.03) (6.05) (6.78) (7.05) (6.83)
Observations 91 100 100 89 91 92
F (Prob > F) 2.78 (.006) 2.67 (.008) 2.92 (.004) 2.79 (.006) 2.70 (.008) 2.86 (.005)
Notes: Dependent variable: Change in Adaptation Policy from 1995 to 2009; Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < .05.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 68–92 87
Table A3(a). Climate aid and Grantham climate policy, 4-year panels.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Climate Policyit−1 0.75** 0.78** 0.77** 0.69** 0.72** 0.72**
(0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16)
Ln(GDP Per Capitait−1) −3.63 −5.81 −5.63 −4.70 −1.93 1.90
(11.09) (9.50) (9.44) (11.51) (10.81) (11.18)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1) 0.29 0.47 0.45 0.40 0.18 −0.05
(0.73) (0.59) (0.58) (0.77) (0.71) (0.74)
Growthit−1 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Ln(Government Spendingit−1) 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.58 0.34 0.21
(1.66) (1.51) (1.50) (1.49) (1.49) (1.47)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1) −0.05 −0.08 −0.09 0.14 0.09 0.12
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.46) (0.46) (0.42)
Ln(Opennessit−1) 0.55 0.41 0.35 0.05 0.24 0.20
(1.96) (1.89) (1.83) (1.85) (2.20) (2.05)
Polityit−1 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Ln(Other ODAit−1) −0.43 −0.16 −0.13 −0.87 −0.69 −0.83
(0.47) (0.40) (0.38) (0.60) (0.51) (0.56)
Ln(Climate Aidit−1) 0.75 −0.02 −0.90 0.21 1.86 1.80
(0.61) (0.45) (0.65) (1.24) (2.55) (2.13)
Constant 12.32 18.26 17.79 14.91 6.34 −8.38
(42.42) (38.91) (38.73) (43.90) (41.27) (42.02)
Observations (Countries) 228 (86) 266 (97) 266 (97) 228 (86) 238 (89) 240 (90)
R-Squared 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70
Notes: Dependent variable: Climate Policyit; Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01; All models include country and year fixed effects.
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Table A3(b). Climate aid and Grantham mitigation policy, 4-year panels.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Climate Policyit−1 0.78** 0.79** 0.78** 0.71** 0.72** 0.72**
(0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.17)
Ln(GDP Per Capitait−1) −0.63 −4.36 −4.37 −1.56 0.05 3.51
(9.76) (8.53) (8.51) (10.07) (9.48) (9.80)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1) 0.07 0.36 0.36 0.17 0.03 −0.18
(0.64) (0.53) (0.52) (0.67) (0.62) (0.65)
Growthit−1 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Ln(Government Spendingit−1) 0.30 0.23 0.31 0.62 0.42 0.38
(1.43) (1.27) (1.26) (1.25) (1.24) (1.18)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1) −0.04 −0.07 −0.07 0.13 0.10 0.13
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) (0.37)
Ln(Opennessit−1) 0.56 0.41 0.37 0.15 0.29 0.23
(1.83) (1.77) (1.72) (1.75) (2.07) (1.89)
Polityit−1 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Ln(Other ODAit−1) −0.33 −0.11 −0.08 −0.73 −0.63 −0.76
(0.39) (0.33) (0.32) (0.47) (0.41) (0.43)
Ln(Climate Aidit−1) 0.65 0.11 −0.63 0.21 2.55 1.62
(0.50) (0.38) (0.56) (1.19) (2.09) (1.78)
Constant 1.32 12.67 12.86 3.80 −0.70 −14.08
(37.60) (35.10) (35.11) (38.61) (36.25) (37.00)
Observations (Countries) 228 (86) 266 (97) 266 (97) 228 (86) 238 (89) 240 (90)
R-Squared 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70
Notes: Dependent variable: Mitigation Policyit; Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01; All models include country and year fixed effects.
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Table A3(c). Climate aid and Grantham adaptation policy, 4-year panels.
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Climate Policyit−1 0.39** 0.47** 0.47** 0.43** 0.49** 0.45**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Ln(GDP Per Capitait−1) −2.74 −1.09 −0.93 −3.02 −1.86 −1.49
(2.12) (1.85) (1.85) (2.29) (2.16) (2.23)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2it−1) 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.24 0.15 0.13
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Growthit−1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Government Spendingit−1) −0.06 −0.07 −0.04 0.03 −0.05 −0.07
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsit−1) −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Ln(Opennessit−1) −0.05 −0.03 −0.05 −0.13 −0.07 −0.07
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17)
Polityit−1 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln(Other ODAit−1) −0.11 −0.05 −0.06 −0.14 −0.06 −0.08
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Ln(Climate Aidit−1) 0.17 −0.11 −0.27 0.02 −0.47 0.10
(0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.26) (0.74) (0.53)
Constant 9.45 3.63 3.05 10.09 6.13 4.63
(8.03) (7.69) (7.75) (8.85) (8.59) (8.76)
Observations (Countries) 228 (86) 266 (97) 266 (97) 228 (86) 238 (89) 240 (90)
R-Squared 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.50
Notes: Dependent variable: Adaptation Policyit; Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01; All models include country and year fixed effects.
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Table A4(a). Climate aid and CLIMI (aid averaged over 2000–2005).
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Ln(GDP Per Capitai) 0.38 0.18 0.20 0.63* 0.54 0.53
(0.36) (0.32) (0.29) (0.31) (0.36) (0.32)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2i ) −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Growthi 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Government Spendingi) −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.01 −0.03 −0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsi) −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Ln(Opennessi) −0.04 −0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Polityi 0.01* 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln(Other ODAi) −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.08* −0.07* −0.07*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln(Climate Commitmentsi) 0.05 0.01 −0.04 −0.34 −0.37 −0.02
(0.11) (0.08) (0.18) (0.39) (0.31) (0.17)
Constant −1.03 −0.46 −0.58 −2.04 −1.66 −1.66
(1.34) (1.29) (1.21) (1.11) (1.36) (1.16)
Observations 46 55 55 46 47 48
R-squared 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.42
Notes: Dependent variable: CLIMIi; Robust standard errors in parentheses, **p < .01 * p < .05.
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Table A4(b). Climate aid and CLIMI (aid averaged over 2005–2010).
Climate Aid Variable
All Climate Mitigation Adaptation All Climate Mitigation Adaptation
Commitments Commitments Commitments Disbursements Disbursements Disbursements
(Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa) (Rio) (Michaelowa) (Michaelowa)
Ln(GDP Per Capitai) 0.45 0.44 0.42 1.02** 1.01** 1.01**
(0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.34) (0.35) (0.32)
Ln(GDP Per Capita2i ) −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.06** −0.06** −0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Growthi 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Government Spendingi) −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Ln(Fossil Fuelsi) 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Opennessi) 0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Polityi 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln(Other ODAi) −0.04 −0.05 −0.03 −0.08** −0.08** −0.06**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Climate Commitmentsi) −0.00 0.02 −0.09 0.05 0.16 −0.13
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.24) (0.11)
Constant −1.49 −1.48 −1.47 −3.54** −3.51* −3.53**
(1.73) (1.65) (1.67) (1.27) (1.32) (1.18)
Observations 46 46 46 44 44 44
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.57 0.57 0.58
Notes: Dependent variable: CLIMIi; Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p < .01 * p < .05.
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